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Separated civil plutonium should be formally regarded as a waste, not a fuel that has value. It is 
time for governments and industries to acknowledge – everywhere – that civil reprocessing, 
plutonium’s provider, is a waste-generating and complicating technology, a source of dangers 
and burdens rather than putative benefits. Much better solutions to spent fuel management and 
energy production now exist. Long unwanted as fuel by utilities, immense stocks of plutonium 
have accumulated in France, Japan, Russia, and the UK from reprocessing programs launched in 
the 1970s. Politically embedded, they continued long after the “plutonium economy” and its fast 
breeder reactors had lost credibility. China, a recent advocate, should beware of the costs of going 
down this road and of stoking insecurities in Asia and beyond if connections to weapon programs 
are feared. Drawing upon a recent book by Frank von Hippel, Masafumi Takubo, and Jungmin 
Kang, this essay provides a fresh perspective on plutonium and reprocessing’s troubled interna-
tional histories, including histories of imagined futures that have so heavily influenced their politics 
and economics.
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Two histories of nuclear power can be recounted. The 
first is the history of the active present. It tells, among 
other things, of the technology’s evolution and role in 
electricity production, its military connections, installed 
types, capacities and performance of reactors, their fuel-
ing and spent fuel discharges, their accidents, the sup-
plying, operating and regulating institutions, and the 
involvement of states. The second is the history of the 
imagined future. It tells of how, at particular moments, 
nuclear power and much connected with it has been 
imagined playing out in years, decades, and even cen-
turies ahead.
Plutonium’s history, of each kind, and its legacies are 
the subject of a recent book by Frank von Hippel, 
Masafumi Takubo, and Jungmin Kang.1 It is an 
impressive study of technological struggle and ultimate 
failure, and of plutonium’s journey from regard as 
a vital energy asset to an eternally troublesome waste.
Toward heaven or hell? The conflict over 
plutonium’s future
The book opens with the discovery of plutonium in the 
early 1940s and the precipitous development of its 
related technologies – weapons and production sys-
tems – during World War II and ensuing Cold War. 
Its future civilian role was only glimpsed early on. This 
changed in the 1960s and 1970s when the imagined 
future of nuclear power, with plutonium at its heart, 
acquired an extraordinary potency, becoming a source 
of serious division and conflict within societies and 
between states. At issue was the great expansion of 
nuclear electricity supply proposed by research and 
development labs, industries, and governments in 
many countries. To sustain the expansion, a transition 
had to be engineered, it was insisted, from uranium- 
fueled “thermal” reactors (mainly light-water) to pluto-
nium-fueled “fast-breeder” reactors, which would 
“breed” more fuel than they consumed, allowing socie-
ties to free themselves from constraints on uranium 
supply and from price inflation as demand increased. 
This transition required immediate, resolute, and heavy 
commitment of resources, starting now, to develop and 
demonstrate fast reactor technology and establish the 
industrial means (that is, reprocessing of spent fuel from 
thermal reactors) of providing the stocks of plutonium 
needed to charge up fast breeders. The year 2000 was 
often identified as when the “plutonium economy” had 
to be up and running.2
A future heaven of technological grandeur and deli-
verance from energy scarcity found itself pitted against 
an imagined, two-part hell: nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion, as separated plutonium became widely available 
from reprocessing plants that were outside inspection 
regimes or hard to safeguard; and eternal vulnerability 
to fast reactor accidents and the release of deadly 
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radionuclides. The debate was enlivened by competing 
visions of energy futures (“hard” paths that emphasize 
large-scale, centralized production facilities versus 
“soft” paths that center on smaller, distributed, renew-
able sources), of policies toward the management of 
reactor fueling and discharges (once-through versus 
closed fuel-cycles) and of approaches to the contain-
ment and eventual disposal of radioactive wastes.
The argument over nuclear futures became an inter-
national storm when the United States – champion of 
civil nuclear expansionism and main provider of 
nuclear technologies and materials – reversed course 
and mounted a campaign to halt reprocessing and the 
development of fast breeder reactors. Spurred by the oil 
crisis, the nuclear visions conjured by the World Energy 
Conference and other seemingly authoritative bodies 
created panic in Washington after India had used civil 
plutonium in its test explosion of 1974. Before me is 
a typical study from the period. Its central scenario 
anticipated that global reactor capacity of 2,550 giga-
watts (GW), including 394 GW of fast reactors, would 
have been installed by 2020 (today’s reality is 420 GW 
with no fast breeders).3 Seventeen countries would 
require substantial plutonium stocks and access to 
reprocessing by that date.
The US government’s aggressive discouragement of 
reprocessing and fast breeder reactor programs was 
fiercely criticized abroad. The Ford and then Carter 
administrations, backed by Congress, were accused of 
striving to kill the nuclear future by imposing con-
straints, often by extraterritorial means, on civil produc-
tion, trade, and development in the nuclear sphere, and 
by encouraging anti-nuclear movements across the 
world.
In defiance, France and the UK launched ambitious 
programs to build large-scale reprocessing plants to 
supply plutonium for fast breeder reactors at home 
and in other Western industrial countries – notably 
Germany and Japan – that needed time to establish 
their own capabilities.4 By the early 1980s, binding con-
tracts and intergovernmental agreements had been 
signed. A circulatory system was envisaged in which 
spent fuels would be reprocessed in France and the 
UK and their products returned to the countries of 
origin, enabling the steady distribution of plutonium 
for the launch of fast reactors.
Unable to prevent this from happening, the United 
States shifted to a policy of, in effect, containment by 
gaining agreement on the reprocessing system’s scope 
and regulation. Being nuclear weapon states, France 
and the UK were granted de facto recognition as 
nuclear-reprocessing-states, to coin a term, with 
Germany and Japan, uniquely among non-nuclear 
weapon states, granted rights as nuclear-reprocessing- 
states-in-waiting. Rigorous safeguards and physical 
protection measures would be applied, no transfers of 
reprocessing technology would occur to states outside 
the Western alliance (and some within it, including 
South Korea), and the US would retain consent rights 
over the reprocessing of certain spent fuels delivered to 
France and the UK. France’s agreement to apply strict 
export controls, including cancellation of plans to 
transfer reprocessing technology to Pakistan and 
other “countries of concern,” and to act “as if” it 
were a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(France did not join until 1992) helped to calm US 
nerves.5
A binary nuclear system was thus instituted in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. One entailed the “total 
reprocessing” of spent nuclear fuels from installed ther-
mal reactors. It was dedicated to realization of 
a plutonium-fueled future, albeit restricted to a limited 
set of industrial countries with two nuclear-weapons- 
states/nuclear-reprocessing-states at its hub. The Soviet 
Union provided another hub in the Eastern Bloc, repro-
cessing spent fuels from satellite countries while keeping 
separated plutonium and fast breeder reactor develop-
ment within the Russian heartland. The other system 
entailed the end of reprocessing and plutonium usage 
for civil purposes and the adoption of spent fuel storage 
and disposal as the standard, in effect creating 
a voluntary and involuntary community of “nuclear- 
non-reprocessing-states,” marshaled by the United 
States.
The plutonium future that so gripped the imagina-
tion and drove policy in the 1970s, for and against, soon 
lost credibility. Nuclear power’s expansion stalled as 
costs rose and accidents occurred, glut replaced scarcity 
in fossil fuel and uranium markets, and cheaper sources 
of electricity (natural gas and eventually renewables) 
became available. Fast breeder prototypes also per-
formed badly, and most designs’ reliance on sodium 
cooling became an Achilles heel. In addition, utilities 
came to realize that increases in the “burn-up” of ura-
nium fuels enabled greater amounts of energy to be 
extracted in situ from the fissioning of uranium-235 
and plutonium, without the rigmarole of separating 
the latter.
Although the Reagan administration looked more 
kindly upon reprocessing than its predecessors, nuclear 
power’s downward trend and the confinement of repro-
cessing to a handful of allied countries allowed 
Washington to relax and cease campaigning to end the 
activity, other than in countries that sought nuclear 
weapons. Concern also shifted in the 1980s and 1990s 
from reprocessing to centrifuge enrichment of uranium, 
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and from power programs to clandestine activity, as the 
likely routes to weapon acquisition.
From creation of a future to preservation of the 
present
Construction of the British and French reprocessing 
plants at Sellafield and Cap de la Hague proceeded 
throughout the 1980s.6 Their primary justification – 
preparing for the introduction of fast breeder reactors – 
had lost all credibility by the time of their completion. 
The German, British, and French breeder programs had 
been cut back, soon to be abandoned, and in 1988 
Germany canceled plans to build its own bulk reproces-
sing plant at Wackersorf. Although Japan’s confidence 
in its fast breeder reactor program also waned, it was 
kept alive to avoid disrupting construction of the repro-
cessing plant at Rokkasho-mura.
Faced by the plutonium economy’s demise, reproces-
sing was re-purposed by its supporters to provide the 
industry and its governmental backers with reason not 
to do the obvious – abandon ship. Creating an essential 
future was replaced by a rationale designed to preserve 
and activate the newly established reprocessing infra-
structures. It had two strands. A techno-economic ratio-
nale: the separation and concentration of radioactive 
wastes into different streams had adherent advantage, 
when it came to disposal, over their retention in unre-
processed spent fuel; and plutonium’s energy value 
could be realized through its replacement of fissile ura-
nium in “mixed-oxide fuels” for use in existing thermal 
reactors (the practice of plutonium-recycling).7 And 
a politico-economic rationale: The costs and risks of 
extrication from reprocessing commitments would 
exceed those of continuation, its difficulties aggravated 
by the political, legal, and contractual entanglements 
that had developed since the projects’ inception.8
Utilities became casualties of this shift in approach. 
Japanese utilities spoke of the “plutonium pressure” to 
which they would be subjected as plutonium extracted 
from their spent fuel was returned for insertion in 
operating thermal reactors, rather than being held in 
store for future fast breeder reactors. Reprocessing con-
tracts had been entered into partly to relieve the spent 
fuel pressures building up at reactor sites and to avert 
the need to expand storage capacities there. They found 
themselves compelled by contractual obligation, threat 
of spent fuel’s return, and state-backed arm-twisting to 
shoulder the increasingly severe costs of reprocessing 
and engagement with plutonium recycling.
Thirty years after the Euro-Japanese reprocessing/ 
recycling system’s launch, the experiment can only be 
judged a failure. The reasons are set out in persuasive 
detail in von Hippel, Takubo, and Kang’s book. It is 
a system undergoing irreversible contraction after 
a long struggle, involving heavy expenditure and many 
troubles. Germany and the UK have already exited, the 
UK shutting its THORP reprocessing plant in 2018 and 
delaying its Magnox reprocessing plant’s closure only 
because of the coronavirus pandemic.9 Instead, its 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority has been given 
the costly (more than $138 billion) and long-lasting 
(more than 100 years) task of returning Sellafield and 
Dounreay to “green-field sites.”
Japan’s engagement with reprocessing and pluto-
nium recycling was already deeply troubled before the 
Fukushima accident closed reactors: The Rokkasho- 
mura reprocessing plant was operating only fitfully, 
MOX recycling was not happening, and plutonium 
separated from Japanese spent fuels in France and the 
UK was marooned there by inability to manage its 
return in MOX fuel (cutting a very long story short).10 
The declared intention to soldier on with bulk reproces-
sing seems increasingly bizarre and is surely unsustain-
able. Although there has long been speculation that 
Japan’s plutonium policies have been buttressed by 
a desire to maintain a military option, von Hippel and 
his colleagues attribute the stubborn commitment to 
reprocessing at Rokkasho-mura mainly to utilities’ 
dependence on the site for spent fuel storage and the 
matching dependence of the Aomori Prefecture, where 
it is located, on the income and employment attached to 
reprocessing.11
Among the involved countries, only France can claim 
success insofar as its reprocessing plants have kept run-
ning, and it has displayed, unlike the UK, some com-
mand of the technology of MOX fuel fabrication.12 
However, rates of plutonium separation and recycling 
have seldom matched, leaving growing surpluses, and 
results have been achieved only through heavy subsidy, 
higher electricity tariffs and disguise of true costs. 
France’s national utility EDF, saddled with enormous 
debts, is striving to reduce its exposure to reprocessing. 
It is symptomatic that no spent fuel discharged from 
EDF-owned and -operated reactors in the UK, including 
those under construction at Hinkley Point, will be 
reprocessed.
The Euro-Japanese reprocessing/recycling system 
has therefore shrunk to one country (France) serving 
only domestic requirements at a gradually diminishing 
level, and another country (Japan) pledged to persist 
with reprocessing and recycling but without any real 
activity. Contraction has become the embedded 
dynamic. The move away from reprocessing is being 
accompanied by a transition toward dry-cask storage 
of spent fuels. It entails their removal from water pools 
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at reactors after a few years’ cooling and their insertion 
in large concrete or stainless steel containers, the former 
pioneered by the US and the latter by Germany.13 The 
Fukushima accident in 2011 has lent urgency to this 
transition, long advocated by von Hippel. Many reactors 
were constructed in the 1960s and 1970s without large 
spent fuel storage, expecting that spent fuels would be 
routinely transported to reprocessing sites after initial 
cooling. “Dense-packing” of water pools became com-
mon as utilities sought to reduce reliance on reproces-
sing. As described in the book under review, it was only 
luck – a leak of water into the pool from an adjoining 
reactor well – that prevented a greater catastrophe at 
Fukushima when a spent fuel store lost its coolant.14
Despite Europe’s retreat from reprocessing, von 
Hippel, Takubo, and Kang express worry that it remains 
alive, with its centre moving to Asia where investment 
in nuclear generating capacity is strongest. Reprocessing 
continues in India and Russia, if fitfully, where fast 
reactor programs are still being funded. Japan’s com-
mitment remains. Although none of these programs has 
significant momentum, they drag on. South Korea has 
also long expressed a desire, against US and other for-
eign objection, to embark on pyroprocessing of its spent 
fuel, a novel technique.
There is particular concern about China’s engage-
ment with reprocessing and its dual civil and military 
purposes. Its “demonstration” reprocessing plant (twin 
units each rated at 200 tons of heavy metal) appears to 
have been designed to serve two 600 MWe fast breeder 
reactors under construction on the coast that may, like 
India’s, provide weapon-grade plutonium from ura-
nium blankets besides serving putative civil needs.15 
The military aspect of China’s reprocessing program 
may explain why its reporting of civilian plutonium 
stocks to the IAEA under the Plutonium Management 
Guidelines ceased in 2017, when a pilot reprocessing 
plant began operating. There is worry that China’s 
investments in reprocessing and fast reactors are serving 
desires to expand weapon arsenals, adding to insecurity 
in East Asia and strengthening Japan and South Korea’s 
interest in plutonium separation that China has long 
sought to discourage. As so often in the past, claims of 
civil requirement can mask military intention, increas-
ing the importance of puncturing the myth of separated 
plutonium’s economic utility.
Might China become the France of the future, 
a country with a heavy state-backed commitment to 
reprocessing and a dogged defender of the separation 
and usage of civil plutonium? At home, perhaps, but its 
regional concerns will surely cause it to be circumspect 
in its advocacy abroad and quest for foreign contracts. 
Whether it can succeed technologically where others 
have failed, not least in overcoming the fast breeder 
reactor’s many difficulties, is also highly questionable.
Separated plutonium is a waste
The authors remind readers of the persistent dangers 
that reprocessing poses to public safety and interna-
tional security: the risks of accident and exposure to 
radiation, the proliferation of weapons, the possibility 
of diversion into nuclear terrorism, and the undesirable 
complication of radioactive waste disposal. “In our view, 
it is time to ban the separation of plutonium for any 
purpose” (their italics) is their concluding sentence. 
This may be the case, but the US and other governments 
are unlikely to respond to their call. They have so much 
else to contend with – climate change, pandemics, eco-
nomic distress, arms racing on a long list – leaving a ban 
on plutonium separation low in their priorities. They 
are also all too aware of past failures to institute such 
bans, whether in commercial or military domains, from 
the Carter Policy in the 1970s to the stalled Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty in the 1990s and subsequently.
Another conclusion cries out to be drawn from this 
book. Plutonium’s separation and usage for energy pur-
poses was an experiment that can now decisively be pro-
nounced a failure. Experience has shown that separated 
civil plutonium is a waste. The book’s first of many figures, 
reproduced here (Figure 1), is the most telling. Up to the 
mid-1980s, the global stock of separated plutonium was 
predominately military and held in warheads, peaking at 
around 200 tons. It now exceeds 500 tons. The increase is 
due to the ballooning of civil stocks as plutonium’s separa-
tion has outstripped consumption. The global stock of 
separated plutonium now includes material extracted 
from the post-Cold War dismantlement of Russian and 
US nuclear warheads that is also effectively a waste.16
The figure tells us that separated plutonium has no 
market clearing price. Utilities shun its usage because 
MOX fuel is intrinsically more expensive to manufac-
ture, by several multiples, than uranium oxide fuels 
because of plutonium’s radioactivity and the consequent 
need for extensive shielding. This applies even when the 
cost of reprocessing is excluded from price calculations, 
as has been customary. Spent MOX fuel also contains 
a more toxic cocktail of radionuclides than spent ura-
nium fuels, creating more hazards and complicating 
storage and disposal.
Civil plutonium is therefore not an asset, it is not 
“surplus to requirement;” it is a waste. This is the message 
that needs to be proclaimed and acknowledged, especially 
by governments, utilities, and industries desiring that 
nuclear power have a solid future and make a contribution 
to the avoidance of global warming. For reasons set out in 
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von Hippel’s recent article in the Bulletin, Bill Gates is 
deluded in believing that the plutonium-fueled, sodium- 
cooled, “Versatile Power Reactor” in which his company 
Terrapower is involved, has a commercial future.17 His 
support is also unwelcome insofar as it helps to perpetuate 
the myth that plutonium is a valuable fuel, posing accep-
table risks to public safety and international security. 
Reprocessing is a waste-producing, not an asset-creating, 
technology. It adds cost rather than value. It merits no 
future when seen in this way.
Even if all civil reprocessing ceased tomorrow, the 
experiment would have bequeathed the onerous task of 
guarding and disposing of over 300 tons of plutonium 
waste, and considerably more when US and Russia’s 
military excess is added in. Proposals come and go. 
Burn it in specially designed reactors? Blend it with 
other radioactive wastes? Bury it underground after 
some form of immobilization? Send it into space? All 
options are costly and hard to implement. Lacking ready 
solutions, most plutonium waste will probably remain 
in store above ground for decades to come, risking 
neglect. How to render this dangerous waste eternally 
safe and secure is now the question.
Notes
1. See von Hippel, Takubo, and Kang (2019). The book 
provides detail on the physics of plutonium and nuclear 
power that will not be covered here.
2. For instance, the 1978 Report of the Windscale Inquiry, 
which recommended construction of the Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield, rested 
its case on the need for sufficient plutonium to fuel 
eight FBRs by 2001, with two added in each 
subsequent year. Available at http://fissilematerials. 
org/library/1978/01/the_windscale_inquiry.html
3. Conducted in the mid- to late-1970s by Stanford 
University and Kernforschungsanlage Jülich, the study 
can be found in Connolly et al. (1982). Note Tables 9.16 
and 9.17 in particular.
4. Relatively small reprocessing contracts were also signed 
with Belgian, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, and 
Swiss utilities.
5. Germany’s ambitious plan to transfer a complete fuel- 
cycle to Brazil was also abandoned under US pressure 
and following the loss of French political shelter.
6. France and the UK’s engagement with reprocessing 
began with the separation of plutonium for military 
purposes from Magnox reactors’ metallic spent fuels. 
The Magnox reactor program was expanded especially 
in the UK to serve civilian purposes. France switched 
earlier than the UK to LWRs and the more complex 
reprocessing of oxide fuels, opening a new site at Cap de 
la Hague for the purpose. The UK ran parallel Magnox 
and oxide reprocessing programs in two large-scale 
plants (B205 and THORP) on the same Sellafield site.
7. Whilst insisting that foreign customers take back and 
recycle their plutonium, the UK exempted itself from 
plutonium recycling in its thermal Advanced Gas- 
Cooled Reactors (AGRs) on grounds that they were 
unsuited to the task. Following the FBR’s abandon-
ment, reprocessing of AGR spent fuels in THORP 
rested, contentiously, on claims that they would suffer 
corrosion if stored over the medium and long terms in 
water pools (dry storage was also rejected). This exemp-
tion partly accounts for location in the UK of the 
world’s largest stockpile of separated civil plutonium 
(currently around 140 tons, including 23 tons of 
Japanese plutonium).
Figure 1. Global stocks of separated plutonium. Note: This figure is Frank von Hippel’s revised and updated version of the book’s 
Figure 1.1.
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8. Problems of extrication, routinely exploited by suppor-
ters of continuation, are discussed in Walker (2000).
9. On the British engagement with and disengagement 
from reprocessing, see Forwood, Mackerron, and 
Walker (2019).
10. See Kuperman and Acharya (2018). The authors 
reported that, in early 2018, Japan’s civil plutonium 
stockpile amounte d to 10.5, 15.5 and 21.2 metric tons 
held in Japan, France, and the UK respectively. On the 
Fukushima accident’s consequences, see Suzuki (2019).
11. The Governor of Aomori prefecture has repeatedly 
threatened to send spent fuels delivered to Rokkasho- 
mura back to reactor sites if the reprocessing plant is 
not operated.
12. On the history and progress of reprocessing and pluto-
nium usage in France, see Schneider and Marignac 
(2008).
13. See Janberg and von Hippel (2009).
14. See especially Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and their accompany-
ing notes in von Hippel, Takubo, and Kang (2019), 84.
15. See Zhang (2020).
16. On this plutonium’s fate, see Lyman (2014).
17. See von Hippel (2021).
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